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Notes
The Visegrad Countries of Central Europe - Integration or
Isolation?
Vincent John Ella
INTRODUCTION
On December 21, 1992 the "Visegrad Four"' countries of
Central Europe - Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and
Slovakia - signed the Central European Free Trade Agreement
(CEFTA) in Krakow, Poland.2 This new agreement will help
rebuild trade relations within Central Europe and spur eco-
nomic growth in these countries. Ultimately, however, the goal
of each of the Visegrad countries is to join the European
Community.
This Note will examine the Visegrad countries' role in the
new dynamics of European trade, and suggest that, while the
new CEFTA is a laudable initiative, the countries of the
Visegrad Four should continue to strive for- full membership in
1. The term "Visegrad Three" was coined by the press when Czechoslova-
kia, Poland and Hungary met in Visegrad, Hungary in February, 1991 to discuss
cooperation in European integration. At that meeting the parties signed the
"Declaration of the Hungarian Republic, the Czech and Slovak Federative Re-
public and the Polish Republic on Cooperation Leading to European Integra-
tion." This Note refers to these four countries (the Czech Republic, Slovakia,
Poland and Hungary) as the Visegrad Countries, Visegrad Group, or Visegrad
Four. Before the division of Czechoslovakia on January 1, 1993, they were
known as the Visegrad Three and sometimes referred to as the Visegrad Trian-
gle or Visegrad Troika. See generally Lidiya Kosikova, Eastern Europe: The
Visegrad Triangle - A New Cooperation Structure in Europe, Reuter Textine
Foreign Trade (USSR), Apr. 19, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library,
Allwld File.
These four countries constitute "Central Europe." "Eastern Europe" refers
to Central Europe plus the Balkan states of Bulgaria, Romania, Albania and the
former Yugoslavia. This Note focuses only on the Visegrad nations of Central
Europe because they have made more progress in reforming their economies
and political systems, and show the most promise for further development. Na-
tions like Romania, Bulgaria and Slovenia will likely follow a path similar to
that of the Visegrad Four but at a slower pace. The experience of the Visegrad
Four should be instructive for these other formerly communist countries.
2. See inkfra part II.
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the European Community. Russian demand for Visegrad ex-
ports has dried up and the European Community has been reluc-
tant to open its markets to Visegrad products in sensitive areas
such as steel and agriculture. Full membership in the European
Community would guarantee markets for Visegrad goods and
give the Visegrad Four a firm footing for economic growth. De-
spite the European Community's already large burden of re-
sponsibilities and challenges, this Note will also assert that it is
in the European Community's own interest to grant the
Visegrad Four full membership in the European Community by
the end of the century. In the meantime, the European Commu-
nity should abide by the spirit of its Europe Agreements3 with
the Visegrad Four and allow greater access to its markets.
Part I of this Note gives a brief history of trade relations
between Eastern and Western Europe. Part II examines the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of the new CEFTA agreement and
its effect on intra-regional trade. Part III looks at the current
Europe Agreements between the Visegrad Four and the Euro-
pean Community. Part IV discusses the Visegrad Four's path
toward EC membership. It concludes that EC membership by
the year 2000 is economically feasible, beneficial to the Visegrad
Four and has several advantages for the European Community.
I. OVERVIEW OF EAST-WEST TRADE RELATIONS
IN EUROPE
A. HISTORY OF EAST-WEST TRADE: 1945-1989
Forty years of Soviet domination severely disrupted tradi-
tional trade patterns in Central Europe. Before World War II,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland had industrial market
economies and traded freely with the rest of Europe.4 After the
war, however, these countries were gathered under the eco-
nomic umbrella of the Soviet Union. Despite their geographic,
historic and cultural proximity, the countries of Central Europe
and the countries of Western Europe were separated by a formi-
dable trade barrier - the Iron Curtain.
Trade among Communist countries was controlled by the
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA).5 The CMEA
3. See irfra part III.
4. See, e.g., Anthony Robinson, Parting Is Such Sweet Sorrow, FIN. POST,
Jan. 2, 1993, at 59 (stating that "between the wars Czech industry was techni-
cally as proficient as Germany's").
5. The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, also known as
COMECON or the CMEA, was created in 1949 and officially dissolved on June
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devised a trading system in which the countries of Eastern Eu-
rope were dependant on the Soviet Union for most of their
trade.6 Meanwhile, the countries of Western Europe, in the pro-
cess of rebuilding their economies, also created new forms of
supra-national economic cooperation, namely the European Eco-
nomic Community (EC),7 and the European Free Trade Area
(EFTA).8
For many years after World War II, formal trade relations
between the European Community and the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance virtually did not exist.9 The Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance initially refused to recognize the
European Community,'0 and the European Community believed
that the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance lacked the au-
thority to make external trade agreements for its members."
As a result, the first EC - CMEA joint declaration did not occur
until June 1, 1988,12 only three years before the Council for Mu-
28, 1991. 1 GATT INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1990-91 16 (1992). Its members were
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the So-
viet Union, Cuba, Mongolia, and Vietnam.
6. Under this system, Eastern Europe typically imported petroleum and
other raw materials from the U.S.S.R. in exchange for agricultural products and
some manufactured products. SUSAN S. NELLO, THE NEW EUROPE: CHANGING
ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST 73 (1991). In 1985, the Soviet
Union accounted for 37.8% of Poland's imports, 45.8% of Czechoslovakia's im-
ports and 30% of Hungary's imports. Id. at 76.
7. The European Communities are the European Coal and Steel Commu-
nity (ECSC), the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the
European Economic Community (EEC). TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN
COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY [ECSC TREATY]; TREATY ESTABLISHING THE Eu-
ROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY [EURATOM TREATY]; TREATY ESTABLISH-
ING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EC TREATY]. Most aspects of these
three bodies were merged in 1971. This Note refers to the European Economic
Community simply as the European Community (EC). There are currently
twelve members in the European Community: Belgium, France, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, Denmark, Greece,
Spain and Portugal.
8. The European Free Trade Area (EFTA) was formed in 1959. It is com-
posed of the nations of Austria, Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Swe-
den, and Switzerland.
9. NELLO, supra note 6, at 15.
10. Id, at 18 (stating that the Soviet Union at one point considered the Eu-
ropean Community an "organ of West European monopoly capitalism doomed
to an inevitable destruction because of its internal contradictions.").
11. David Kennedy & David E. Webb, Integration: Eastern Europe and the
European Communities 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNT'L L. 633, 636 (1990). The Euro-
pean Community did conclude a number of bilateral sectoral agreements with
individual Soviet Bloc nations on products such as steel and agriculture. NELLO,
supra note 6, at 34-36.
12. Council Decision 88/345 of 22 June 1988 on the Conclusion of the Joint
Declaration on the Establishment of Relations Between the European Eco-
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tual Economic Assistance was dissolved.'i
Technically, trade relations between the European Commu-
nity and the Visegrad countries are also subject to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 14 Poland and Hun-
gary were allowed to join GATT in 1967 and 1973 respectively.
This was partially due to political pressure by the United States
which wished to reduce Soviet influence in Poland and Hun-
gary.15 Czechoslovakia joined GATT a few months before the
Communists consolidated power in 1948, and remained a mem-
ber until it divided into the Czech Republic and Slovakia on De-
cember 31, 1992.16
The European Community developed special mechanisms
for dealing with state-run economies under GATT.17 For exam-
ple, the European Community routinely set quantitative restric-
tions on products from Eastern Europe'8 to ensure reciprocal
gains in trade with the centrally planned economies of Eastern
Europe, and as a means to protect Western industries.19 West-
ern countries also imposed restrictions on the sale or transfer of
sensitive goods and technology from the West to the Eastern
Bloc as a security measure during the Cold War era.20
nomic Community and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, 1988 O.J.
(L 157) 15 (stipulating that cooperation would be developed in "areas of mutual
competence and interest.").
13. GATT INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1990-91, supra note 5.
14. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. pts. 5, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATTI].
15. Leah Haus, The East European Countries and GATT The Role of Real-
ism, Mercantilism, and Regime Theory in Explaining East-West Trade Negotia-
tions 45 INT'L ORG. 163 (1991); see also Janos Martonyi, Eastern European
Countries and the GATT, in THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF TRADE
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND EASTERN EUROPE (Marc
Maresceau ed., 1987).
16. Haus, supra, note 15, at 164. On February 9, 1993, a session of the
GATT Council approved a text of a protocol on the Slovakia and the Czech
Republic joining GATT. GATT Council Approves Protocol on Czech and Slovak
Republics, BBC, Feb. 13, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, AlIwId File.
17. The GATT is structured for countries with market-oriented economies.
Its signatories, however, devised special procedures to deal with centrally
planned economies. NELLO, supra note 6, at 29; see also, GATT, supra note 14,
art. VI, para. 1, subparas. 1, 2; Agreement on Interpretation and Application of
Articles VI, XVI and XVIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
B.I.S.D. 26th Supp. 56-83 (1980) (GATT Subsidies Code, pt. IV Special Situa-
tions); see generally Haus, supra note 15.
18. NELLO, supra note 6, at 4; Hans, supra note 15, at 176.
19. Quantitative restrictions are generally not allowed under GATT. Haus,
supra note 15, at 176.
20. The Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls, or
COCOM, sets limits on exports of "strategic" items and certain technologies to
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The European Community also frequently brought an-
tidumping complaints against Eastern Europe.2 ' Because prices
of Eastern goods were not determined by market forces, almost
any East European import risked an antidumping attack. The
"normal value" of goods imported from Communist countries
was determined by using the cost of the same or equivalent
product in a third country with a market economy.22 The Euro-
pean Community continues to use antidumping complaints
against countries in Eastern Europe, although the number of
such complaints has decreased since 1985. 23
East-West trade relations began to thaw even before the
people of Eastern Europe overthrew their communist govern-
ments in 1989 and 1990. The European Community first signed
bilateral trade and cooperation agreements with Czechoslovakia
and Hungary in 1988, and with Poland in 1989.24 These first gen-
eration agreements began to normalize trade relations by reduc-
ing the amount of quantitative restrictions on Eastern
products.25 The agreements included typical safeguard clauses,
however, which allowed either party to limit imports which
would cause "serious injury" to its own producers. Similar
clauses have been retained in second generation "Europe Agree-
ments" which replaced the first generation agreements.
26
certain nations. Japan, Australia, all EC members except Ireland, and all
NATO members except Iceland are bound by COCOM. Kennedy & Webb,
supra note 11, at 643. COCOM has lifted all restrictions on trade with Hungary,
and has promised to do so for Poland as soon as it passes the necessary safe-
guard legislation. Poland Attends Cocom Forum for First Time, BBC Summary
of World Broadcasts, Dec. 10, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld
File. The current status of the Czech Republic and Slovakia under COCOM is
not clear.
21. Kennedy & Webb, supra note 11, at 641.
"Dumping" is the practice of exporting goods at lower prices than normal
domestic value. Antidumping complaints are allowed under GAT'T, the EC
Treaty, and the ECSC Treaty. GATT, supra note 14, art. VI; EC TREATY, supra
note 7, art. 113; ECSC TREATY, supra note 7, art. 74. From 1970 until 1982, there
were 122 EC antidumping actions against Central and Eastern Europe. In 1981,
Central and Eastern European countries comprised 69% of all EC antidumping
complaints. NELLO, supra note 6, at 51.
22. Kennedy & Webb, supra note 11, at 641.
23. NELLO, supra note 6, at 51. Steel will likely be a target area for future
antidumping measures by the European Community. See infra part III.
24. Council Decision 89/215, 1989, 32 O.J. (L 88) 1 (Czechoslovakia); Coun-
cil Decision 88/595, 1988 31 O.J. (L 327) 1 (Hungary); Council Decision 89/593,
32 O.J.(L 339) 1 (1989) (Poland).
25. Gerwin Van Gerven & Takao Suami, New Legal Framework for Trade
Relations Between the EC and the Central and Eastern European Countries,
INT'L Bus. L., Mar. 1991, at 155.
26. See irnfra part III.
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B. ASSISTANCE TO EASTERN EUROPE
The industrialized countries of the West responded to the
1989-90 revolutioh in Eastern Europe by initiating a number of
programs designed to assist the East with its economic and social
transformation. The two most important early initiatives were
the PHARE program (Poland and Hungary - Aid to Recon-
struct Economies) and the EBRD (European Bank for Recon-
struction and Development).
The PHARE program was created in July 1989 to assist Po-
land and Hungary.27 One year later it expanded to cover Czech-
oslovakia, Romania and Bulgaria.28 It is coordinated by the EC
Commission on behalf of the European Community,29 the mem-
bers of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment,30 and the International Monetary Fund.31
PHARE provides food aid, assistance for agricultural re-
structuring, environmental cooperation, vocational training, and
investment promotion.32 The PHARE program eliminated
quantitative restrictions for some Visegrad products,33 and
granted generalized system of trade preferences (GSP) status on
others.34 Trade relations between the European Community
and the Visegrad countries are now covered by interim Europe
Agreements.35
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
27. Trade Relations Eastern Europe, Coopers & Lybrand EC Commenta-
ries, Sept. 3, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File [hereinafter
Trade Relations].
28. Id
29. The EC Commission is the body responsible for drafting EC legislative
proposals and negotiating international agreements. The fact that the Euro-
pean Community was chosen to direct the PHARE program highlights the Eu-
ropean Community's leadership position in this process of reintegrating Central
and Eastern Europe with the West. Kennedy & Webb, supra note 11, at 649.
30. The member countries of the OECD are Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.
Convention on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
Dec. 14, 1960, 12 U.S.T. 1728.
31. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was created at the Bretton
Woods Conference in 1944. It is a supranational organization committed to sta-
bilizing the international monetary system through short-term lending and
other measures.
32. Trade Relations, supra note 27.
33. Van Gerven & Suami, supra note 25, at 152.
34. EEC/Eastern European Relations, Commission of the European Com-
munities, May 21, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library Allwld File.
35. See infra part III.
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was formed on April 15, 1991. Its mission is to assist Eastern
Europe's transition market economies, promote private and en-
trepreneurial initiatives, and encourage investment in Eastern
Europe.3 6 The Bank has an operating budget of 10 billion
ECU,3 7 70% of which is to be held in reserve and 30% is to be
loaned out immediately.s s Forty percent of the Bank's total fi-
nancing is allocated for the public sector and 60% is allocated for
the private sector.3 9 The EBRD provides important financial
stability to the Visegrad group as it undergoes the difficult task
of creating a market economy.
Although these temporary aid programs have been benefi-
cial, they have treated the Visegrad Four more like developing
countries requiring unilateral assistance than full-fledged par-
ticipants in the economic structure of Europe.40 The long-term
economic prosperity of the Visegrad Group will depend on ex-
ternal trade, especially with the European Community.4 1 Thus,
aid programs such as PHARE and the EBRD were not enough
for the Visegrad Group to continue their transformation. Due to
their geographic and historic position and their successful polit-
ical and economic reform, the Visegrad countries sought closer
ties to the European Community, including greater access to its
markets and eventual membership. In response to these re-
quests, 42 representatives from the European Community and
each of the Visegrad countries drafted Association Agreements,
36. Trade Relations, supra note 27; see also NELLO, supra note 6, at 91.
37. European Currency Units (ECU). The ECU is based on "basket" of EC
member currencies and used by the European Community for budget purposes
and statistical valuations. As of April 6, 1993, one ECU equaled approximately
U.S. $1.21. WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 1993, at C13.
38. NELLO, supra note 6, at 190.
39. Trade Relations, supra note 27.
40. These programs can be compared to the European Community's Lom6
Convention (first signed in 1975, and most recently expanded in 1990) which is
directed at a number of developing countries in Africa and the Caribbean, and
provides free trade access to EC markets for selected products, as well as finan-
cial and technical aid, but does not create reciprocal free trade benefits for the
European Community and certainly does not foresee EC membership for the
participating nations. See RALPH H. FOLSOM, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW IN A
NUTSHELL 226-31 (1991).
41. JOHN PINDER, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND EASTERN EUROPE 31
(1991); Jonathan Lynn, West Must Open Markets to E. Europe - Economists,
Reuters, Dec. 8, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File (quoting
Andras Inotai, director of Hungary's Institute for World Economics: "[Exports
are vital,] without exports as engine of growth I really don't see how we can
make a successful recovery.").
42. See Draft of Europe Agreement, infra note 95, at the preamble.
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later renamed Europe Agreements, in 1991.43 These agreements
are designed to lower trade barriers on both sides and to in-
crease political cooperation. They do not, however, include a
solid commitment to eventual EC membership.44
C. AFTER THE REVOLUTIONS: EAST-WEST TRADE 1989-1993
Partly as a result of early EC assistance such as the PHARE
program and the EBRD, historic East-West trade patterns
quickly began to reestablish themselves after the fall of commu-
nism in 1989-1990. Eastern European trade with the former So-
viet Union declined sharply, while trade with the European
Community increased dramatically.45
In 1990, EC imports from Poland increased 54%; imports
from Hungary increased 31%; and imports from Czechoslovakia
increased 20%.46 From the second quarter of 1991 through the
second quarter of 1992, EC imports from the Visegrad Group
continued to increase by a rate of nearly 30%. 4 7 In 1992, Poland
exported an average of $700 million in goods to the European
Community per month.48 Germany in particular accounts for a
large portion of Visegrad trade.49
The increase in East-West trade seems certain to continue.
Current East-West trade in Europe is only about one-fifth of
what it was before World War II,50 and it is estimated that EC
exports to Eastern Europe could exceed those to the United
43. See infra part III.
44. See infra part III.
45. In 1990, Eastern European imports from the USSR fell 25% and East-
ern European exports to the USSR fell 12%, GATT INTERNATIONAL TRADE
1990-91, supra note 5, at 18. Czech, Hungarian and Polish exports to the Euro-
pean Community increased 20%, 21% and 54% respectively. Id. at 17.
46. Id. When the increases are broken down by sector, the importance of
agriculture, steel and textile exports for these countries is obvious. Agriculture:
Hungary up 10%, CSFR up 8%, Poland up 43%. Iron and Steel: Hungary up
46%, CSFR up 26%, Poland up 57%. Textiles (clothing): Hungary up 40%,
CSFR up 42%, Poland up 77%. Id
47. Richard W. Stevenson, Eastern Europe Says Barriers to Trade Hurt Its
Economies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1993, at Al (citing OECD statistics).
48. Id
49. In fact, trade with Germany accounts for a larger share of the Visegrad
countries' economies than the economies of France or Denmark. Trade with
Germany (exports and imports) accounts for 12%-15% of the GDP of the
Visegrad Group, but only 4-12% of the GDPs of Britain, Italy, France or Den-
mark. Europe's Hard Core, ECONOMIST, Nov. 21, 1992, at 78.
50. Garath G. Cook & Tim Snyder, Western Europe's Economic Might Is
Key to Stability in the East, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 12, 1993, at 19 (based
on data from the League of Nations); Anthony Robinson, The European Mar-
ket, FIN. TIMES LTD., Nov. 9, 1992, at 2. Before the 1930s, 17% of German ex-
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States in fifteen years.51 Continued growth will depend, how-
ever, on the willingness of the European Community to abide by
its Europe Agreement commitment to open markets. Assuming
it does, one study predicts that in the long run, EC exports to the
Visegrad Group will increase 872% and Visegrad exports to the
European Community will increase 804%.52
II. THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT
While increased Visegrad trade with the West is not a nega-
tive development, it has come at the expense of intra-regional
trade.5 3 Since the fall of communism and the dissolution of the
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, the countries of Cen-
tral Europe have been trading more with Western Europe than
with each other. Three factors contributed to this shift in trad-
ing patterns. First, former members of the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance started demanding that payment settle-
ments be made in hard currency after the Council was dis-
solved.54 Second, Eastern consumers had a pent-up demand for
Western goods.55 Third, the Visegrad countries negotiated trade
concessions as part of the Europe Agreements with the Euro-
pean Community and agreements with EFTA, but erected high
tariff barriers among themselves.5 6 This meant that goods from
ports went to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. In 1989, the figure was
approximately 4%. PINDER, supra note 41, at 4.
51. NELLO, supra note 6, at 92.
52. CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, IS BIGGER BET-
TER? THE ECONOMICS OF EC ENLARGEMENT 81 (1992) [hereinafter CEPR] (stat-
ing that "the opening of the East could provide export market opportunities to
Western economies on a scale unprecedented in modern history.").
53. Intra-regional trade among CMEA countries declined 20% in 1990.
GATT INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1990-91, supra note 5, at 15.
54. Id at 16. Before the collapse of the CMEA, payment accounts were
settled in convertible rubles. The collapse of this system caused each former
CMEA member country to demand payment in hard currency, while reserving
its own scarce hard currency for crucial imports from the West and petroleum
from the former Soviet Union. Since then, new procedures have been devel-
oped and this process should be facilitated by the CEFTA agreement. Eventu-
ally, all four members expect to make the transition to full convertibility.
55. Dr. Peter Rutland, Czechoslovakia, in EASTERN EUROPE AND THE COM-
MONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES 145 (1992); NELLO, supra note 6, at 76.
56. According to one 1992 report, imports from other East European coun-
tries cost 2-3 times more than those from the EC countries partially because of
higher "import taxes." In Hungary these "taxes" were about 10-13% while
West European goods were taxed at 4%. Polish tariffs on Eastern goods were
about 15%. Czechoslovakia, which began liberalizing early, had significantly
lower tariffs, about 4.7%, which caused stiff competition for its domestic produ-
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the European Community became cheaper than goods from for-
mer CMEA members,5 7 causing intra-regional trade to decline
dramatically.58 The Central European Free Trade Agreement5 9
should help correct this distortion.
A. STRUCTURE
The new CEFTA agreement should bring intra-Visegrad
tariffs in line with Visegrad-EC tariffs.6° Tariff reductions
under the agreement are currently set to take place over an
eight-year period. As a result of lobbying by the representative
from the Czech Republic, however, all four parties signed a dec-
laration of commitment to talks aimed at reducing the transition
time to no more than five years.6'
Until recently, two of the Visegrad countries, the Czech Re-
public and Slovakia, were parts of the same country. Both gov-
ernments have indicated that it is their intention to maintain a
customs union and to allow the free movement of goods and peo-
ple between the two newly independent countries.6 2 This
should not conflict with the larger aims of the CEFTA, and in
fact the two arrangements should reinforce each other.
cers. Thus, Czechoslovakia had a large incentive to harmonize tariffs with
other Visegrad nations as part of CEFTA. Kosikova, supra note 1, at 4-5.
57. Miroslaw Glogowski, Free Trade in Central Europe, WARSAW VOICE,
Jan. 10, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File (citing the exam-
ple of Hungarian pharmaceutical products being forced out of the Polish
market).
58. Intra-regional trade decreased 20% in 1990. 1I Polish Economist Dari-
usz Rosati estimates that the collapse of East Bloc trade accounted for one-third
of Poland's 1991 drop in GDP. Poland's GDP fell 20% over 1989-91. Lynn,
supra note 41.
59. An official text of the agreement is not yet available in the United
States. Telephone Interview with Barnabas Nemeth, Embassy of Hungary
Trade Representation, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 4, 1993). For a description of the
terms of the agreement, see generally Glogowski, supra note 57.
The charter members of the CEFTA are Hungary, Poland and Czechoslo-
vakia (now the Czech Republic and Slovakia). The Hungarian Minister for For-
eign Affairs, Geza Jeszensky, has indicated that the agreement might be
extended to include Slovenia. Czech Premier Objects to Visegrad Cooperation,
GAZETA WYBORCZA No. 8, PAP, Jan. 11, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Li-
brary, Allwld file [hereinafter Czech Premier Objects]. Because the agreement
is meant to be a temporary arrangement until the Visegrad Four are allowed to
join the European Community, it is unlikely that its membership will expand.
60. Under both the CEFTA and the Europe Agreements, all non-agricul-
tural tariffs are scheduled to be eliminated over periods from five to ten years.
61. Czech, Slovak Republics Join Free Trade Zone Agreement, CTK Na-
tional News Wire, Dec. 21, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld
File.
62. Robinson, supra note 4.
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The CEFTA places most products into one of three catego-
ries.63 Group A includes many raw materials as well as finished
and unfinished products which are not seen as competing with
various domestic industries, such as cellulose, silk, wool, asbes-
tos, some pharmaceutical products, and spare parts for cars.
Products in group A became duty free March 1, 1993.64
Group B includes industrial goods such as lighting equip-
ment, medical and ceramic products, and train wagons and loco-
motives. Customs duties on products in group B will be reduced
to 66% of the original tariff by 1995, to 33% of the original by
1996, and completely eliminated by 1997.65
Group C includes sensitive products such as textiles, steel
and televisions. 66 Customs duties on products in group C will be
reduced by 10% in 1995 and 15% annually thereafter until Janu-
ary 1, 2001 when all customs duties on non-agricultural Visegrad
products will be eliminated. 67
The CEFTA makes separate provisions for automobiles and
agricultural products.68 The current 35% nominal charge on au-
tomobile imports will be reduced annually by 5%.69 Total reduc-
tions on agricultural tariffs under the current Agreement are
not great - only 20 to 50% by the end of the phase-out period.
In addition, the Agreement introduces quantitative restrictions
on many agricultural products.70 Intra-Visegrad trade in agri-
culture, however, should increase as a result of the Agreement. 7'
B. BENEFITS OF THE CEFTA
The CEFTA will spur intra-Visegrad trade by allowing in-
creased specialization and economies of scale among its mem-
bers.72 For example, Poland predicts that reducing tariffs by
63. Glogowski, supra note 57.
64. Id.
65. Id
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Free Trade Agreement of Visegrad Three: The First Common Step To-
wards European Integration, Says Kadar, MTI Hungarian News Agency, Dec.
21, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File [hereinafter First
Common Step Says Kadar].
72. The goal and justification of every free trade area is a more efficient
allocation of resources. This may not be the result if the effect of a free trade
area is to cause more trade diversion than trade creation. Free trade areas com-
prised of countries of roughly equal economic development, such as the
Visegrad Four, are less likely to be trade diverting and more likely to be trade
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one-third will result in a 10% increase in Polish exports to Hun-
gary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, and that a two-thirds re-
duction will increase these exports by 30%.73 The greatest profit
for Poland should come from the sale of fuel, raw materials and
chemicals. 74 Hungary predicts that the free trade area will be
particularly good for its agricultural exports.75
For many years, Poland, Hungary and the former Czecho-
slovakia had close economic relations as part of the Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance, including specialization and coop-
eration in manufacturing and the joint processing of raw materi-
als.76 Slovakia and the Czech Republic, of course, have
extensive economic ties. Due to nationalist jealousies, however,
these ties may be better encouraged and continued under the
auspices of a multinational agreement.77 Until their currencies
become convertible, the Visegrad countries need to continue to
devise methods of mutual payment settlements.78 In sum, these
countries should not immediately abandon all past trade rela-
tionships for new contacts with the West.
The CEFTA should improve Visegrad relations with West-
ern Europe. All four signatories seek the stability and benefits
of full membership in the European Community. Together,
rather than separately, they wield more political bargaining
power in negotiations with the European Community. As the
Visegrad countries begin drafting new legislation suitable for
market economies, the CEFTA will help coordinate efforts to
develop these laws and industrial standards to conform to EC
norms.79 This will facilitate the process of application for EC
creating. Direct competition in similar industries is more likely to expose com-
petitive disadvantages. Because the Visegrad economies are highly industrial-
ized they will compete directly with the European Community as well, so that
the EC-Visegrad Europe Agreements are unlikely to create much trade diver-
sion either. For the seminal work on the issue of trade diversion versus trade
creation, see generally JACOB VINER, THE CUSTOMS UNION ISSUE (1950). Re-
garding increased benefits for countries with similar economic development, see
id, at 51.
73. Glogowski, supra note 57 (predicting that a total lifting of duties for
economic exchange in the [Visegrad] region would give Poland profits of 4.75
trillion Zlotys).
74. Id.
75. First Common Step Says Kadar, supra note 71.
76. Kosikova, supra note 1. For example, landlocked Hungary, Slovakia
and the Czech Republic can gain access to Poland's Baltic Sea ports.
77. Susan Greenburg, Switzerland: Open Markets Fear Free Trade Failure,
Reuter Textline, Feb. 6, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
78. See generally Kosikova, supra note 1.
79. Free Trade Agreement at Centre of Polish Premier's Talks on Hungary,
BBC, Sept. 28, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
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membership. The agreement also demonstrates to the European
Community the Visegrad Countries' ability to work together
and compromise, as well as their commitment to free trade.80
Finally, these four countries together comprise a market of 65
million people - a more attractive market to foreign investors
than three small countries and one medium-sized one.8 '
In addition to liberalizing trade and improving ties with the
West, the Visegrad agreement is also aimed at increasing intra-
Visegrad political dialogue.82 The CEFTA may serve as a forum
for discussion on issues such as Slovakia's treatment of its large
Hungarian minority, or the construction of the controversial
Gabcivkovo dam between Hungary and Slovakia.83 Also, all four
Visegrad countries are wary of the rising economic hegemony of
Germany, and may find security in mutual cooperation."
C. RESISTANCE TO THE CEFTA
Some resistance to regional cooperation in Central Europe
still exists, and one should not over-estimate the signatories'
commitment to joint negotiations with the European Commu-
nity. Any of the signatories would probably jump ship if offered
membership in the European Community before the others.8 5
Ideally CEFTA will be only a temporary agreement until the
Visegrad Four are able to join the European Community. In the
meantime the Agreement is a positive development for Euro-
pean trade.
III. THE EUROPE AGREEMENTS
The basis for present day trade relations between the Euro-
80. First Common Step Says Kadar, supra note 71.
81. Id. Population, in millions: the Czech Republic 10.4, Hungary 10.4, Po-
land 38.2, Slovakia 5.3. Check, 0 Slovakia, ECONOMIST, June 27, 1992, at 55;
CEPR, supra note 53, at 61.
82. Free Trade Agreement at Centre of Polish Premier's Talks on Hungary,
supra note 79.
83. Central Europe Trade Pact Should Be Signed Next Week, Reuter Li-
brary Report, Dec. 17, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, AlIwId File.
84. United in Rivalry, ECONOMIST, July 11, 1992, at 27.
85. Czech Premier Objects, supra note 59, (quoting Czech Prime Minister
Vaclav Klaus). Klaus said that the Visegrad Group was a process artificially
created by the West, that the "Czechs were not interested in it" and that in two
or three years "the Czech Republic would be able to join the European Commu-
nity on its own." Id. Klaus' comments have been discounted by officials from
the Czech Republic and other CEFTA member countries, but they point to a
cynical belief by some that the West is trying to relegate the Visegrad Countries
to a "poor man's Club." Polish, Czech Views on Visegrad Grouping - In Focus,
CTK National News Wire, Feb. 4, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library,
Allwld File (quoting Polish president Lech Walesa).
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pean Community and the Visegrad countries is the "Europe
Agreement." On December 16, 1991, foreign ministers from
Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary each signed bilateral sec-
ond-generation association agreements, called Europe Agree-
ments, with the European Community.sa Each Agreement still
must be ratified by the national parliaments of the particular
Visegrad country and all twelve EC member states.
Until the permanent Europe Agreements are formally rati-
fied, their trade provisions have become effective under "In-
terim Agreements" signed between the European Community
and Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary.8 7 Because the Euro-
pean Community has exclusive authority to conduct common
86. The European Community is authorized to form reciprocal association
agreements with a "third state or union of states." EC TREATY, supra note 7,
art. 238.
Free trade areas and customs unions are allowed as an exception to the
most favored nation (MFN) principle under GA'IT. GATT, supra note 14, art.
XXIV.
The Europe Agreements will have the effect of creating four free trade
areas, one between each Visegrad signatory and the European Community.
They do not create a customs union (i.e. a free trade area with common external
tariffs), nor does the CEFTA arrangement. According to GATT, Article XXIV
para. 8(b), in order to qualify as a free trade area the arrangement must elimi-
nate duties and other restrictive measures of commerce on "substantially all the
trade" between the parties. The meaning of "substantial" in this context has
never been fully determined, although virtually all efforts to establish free
trade areas in the past have gone unchallenged under GATT. JOHN H. JACKSON
& WILLIAM K. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELA-
TIONS 454-63 (2d ed. 1986).
The United States has, however, reacted to these agreements with some
alarm. The Commerce Department believes that they are biased against Amer-
ican goods and has indicated that the United States will pursue a GATT com-
plaint regarding the Agreements. U.S. Officials See Bias Against U.S. in EC
Trade with Nations of East Europe, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1560, Sept. 2, 1992.
Former President George Bush proposed the creation of a free trade zone
between the United States and the Visegrad nations in September 1992. The
Czech Foreign Ministry said that the proposal "falls in no way within the con-
text of Czechoslovakia's effort to build intensive economic relations in the
framework of Europe, particularly with the [EC and EFTA]." Czechoslovakia-
US. Trade, CTh National News Wire, Sept. 13 and 14, 1992, available in
LEXIS, Europe Library, ALLEUR File.
87. Council Decision 92/228 of 25 February 1992 on the Conclusion by the
European Economic Community of the Interim Agreement Between the Euro-
pean Economic Community and Poland on Trade and Trade-related Matters,
1992 O.J. (L 114) 1 [hereinafter Poland Interim Agreement]; Council Decision
92/229 of 25 February 1992 on the Conclusion by the European Economic Com-
munity of the Interim Agreement Between the European Economic Commu-
nity and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic on Trade and Trade-related
Matters, 1992 O.J. (L 115) 1 [hereinafter Czechoslovakia Interim Agreement];
Council Decision 92/230 of 25 February 1992 on the Conclusion by the European
Economic Community of the Interim Agreement Between the European Eco-
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external commercial policy on behalf of its member states,88 it
quickly ratified the trade aspects of the Europe Agreements by
creating Interim Agreements.89 The Europe Agreements also
extend to political and other non-trade matters, and thus must
go through the longer ratification process described above.
The division of Czechoslovakia into two new countries has
delayed ratification of what will now be four Europe Agree-
ments, because European parliaments had planned to ratify all
of the Agreements together.90 The Czech Republic and Slovakia
are now re-negotiating separate Agreements.91 In order to allow
time for negotiations, the EC Council has extended the validity
of all four Interim Agreements indefinitely.92 The Interim
Agreement signed with Czechoslovakia will be valid with re-
spect to both the Czech Republic and Slovakia until new Agree-
ments are negotiated.93
The European Community may take advantage of the op-
portunity to make the new Czech and Slovak agreements more
strict by conditioning trade concessions on guarantees concern-
ing matters such as human rights, the environment, and arms
sales, or by tightening restrictions on products such as steel.94
For the purposes of this Note, however, the trade aspects of the
Interim Agreements and the Europe Agreements are presumed
to be the same unless otherwise noted.
A. STRUCTURE
Each Europe Agreement calls for the creation of an "Associ-
ation Council" composed of members of the Council of the Euro-
pean Community and the individual Visegrad government. 95
nomic Community and Hungary on Trade and Trade-related Matters, 1992 O.J.
(L 116) 1 [hereinafter Hungary Interim Agreement].
88. EC TREATY, supra note 7, art. 113.
89. The Interim Agreements took effect on March 1, 1992. EEC/Eastern
European Relations, supra note 34.
90. EC Council Extends Interim Agreements with Poland, Hungary and
Czechoslovakia for Indefinite Period, Reuter Textline, Dec. 8, 1992, available in
LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
91. Reports on Czech and Slovak Republics, Czechoslovakia's Provisional
Agreement with EC Extended to Cover the Split, BBC Dec. 21, 1992, available in
LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. EC/Eastern Europe: European Community Member States Set Steel
Quotas, European Information Service, Jan. 6, 1993, available in LEXIS, World
Library, Allwld File (regarding the potential for new "tariff quotas" on Czech
and Slovak steel) [hereinafter Steel Quotas].
95. Draft of Agreement Establishing an Association Between the European
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The Council will be responsible for examining any issues arising
within the framework of the agreement, settling disputes and
continuing a political dialogue between the European Commu-
nity and the Visegrad governments. 6
The goal of these Agreements is to gradually establish a free
trade area between the European Community and each Visegrad
country over a transitional period lasting a maximum of ten
years.97 In addition to decreasing trade barriers, the Europe
Agreements encourage economic cooperation, provide technical
and financial aid, establish projects to improve infrastructure,
and provide for political, informational and cultural ex-
changes.98 The free movement of workers is not envisaged
under the agreements.99
The Agreements are based on the principle of asymmetry.
That is, they call for the European Community to lower trade
barriers more quickly than the Visegrad side, so that Central
European industries will have more time to become competi-
Community and Poland, arts. 28, 102 [hereinafter Draft of Europe Agreement]
(Draft available from Delegation of the European Communities, Washington,
D.C.). The analysis in this Note is based on the draft of the EC-Poland agree-
ment received from the EC Delegation in Washington, D.C.; all three original
agreements are virtually identical in structure. The new agreements with the
Czech Republic and Slovakia could differ significantly, however.
96. Id art. 105.
97. Id. art. 7.
98. Id. tit. VI, arts. 71-101. Specifically, cooperation will focus on: indus-
trial cooperation, investment promotion and protection, approximation of stan-
dards, science and technology, education and training, agriculture, energy,
nuclear safety, the environment, water management, transportation, telecom-
munications, broadcasting, banking, insurance, monetary policy, audit and fi-
nancial control, money laundering, regional development, social cooperation,
tourism, customs, statistical cooperation, economics, and drugs.
99. The agreements provide only for the transferability of pension, medical
and insurance payments, freedom from discrimination, and employment for
spouses of those already legally working within the other party's borders. Id.
arts. 37, 38. While the Visegrad countries have asked for greater mobility for
their workers, some have suggested that this type of mobility could lead to a
"brain drain" as skilled Eastern professionals seek higher wages and greater
opportunities in the West. Will More Be Merrier?, ECONOMIST, Oct. 17, 1992, at
75. The European Community is also concerned about increased immigration
from the East. Id.
In its report, Is BIGGER BErR?, the CEPR examines the relationship be-
tween trade and investment on one hand, and emigration (legal or illegal) on
the other. If workers in Central Europe have reason to expect more jobs due to
capital investment from increased trade, they will be less likely to emigrate
west. This in turn raises the amount of available workers and ultimately keeps
wage rates down which encourages more capital investment. CEPR, supra note
52, at 57.
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tive.1°° Existing trade barriers on the Visegrad side, however,
are often three times as high as those on the EC side, so the
ultimate gain for the European Community is arguably
greater.10 ' EC tariffs on most goods from the Visegrad countries
will be immediately abolished upon each agreement's entry into
force.10 2 EC tariffs on certain industrial products from the
Visegrad countries will be reduced by 50% immediately, and
completely eliminated after one year.10 3 Tariffs on other prod-
ucts will be reduced progressively by 20% per year for four
years.1°4 All EC tariffs on Visegrad goods other than textiles,
coal, steel and agriculture will be eliminated within five years.10 5
All EC quantitative restrictions will be eliminated on the date
each Agreement enters into force, except for those on agricul-
tural products, and some restrictions on textiles, coal and
steel.10° Most Czech, Slovak, Hungarian and Polish customs du-
ties will be decreased 20% per year, starting three years after the
Agreements take effect. 10 7 Free trade in all areas except agri-
culture is planned after the end of the ten-year adjustment
period.
Each Europe Agreement contains a safeguard clause in Ar-
ticle 30. 108 Parties to the agreements may also bring antidump-
ing complaints under GATT Article VI 0 9 when a product is
imported in such quantities that it causes "serious injury or dis-
100. HUNGARIAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, EC-HUNGARY 1992 2 (1992) [here-
inafter Hungarian Chamber of Commerce]; Hungary: No Excitement About EC
Association Agreement, Figyelo Reuter Textline, Nov. 21, 1991, available in
LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
101. Hungary: No Excitement About ECAssociation Agreement, supra note
100 (comparing Hungarian tariffs to EC tariffs).
102. Draft of Europe Agreement, supra note 95, art. 9, paras. 1, 4.
103. Id. art. 9, para. 2.
104. Id. art. 9, paras. 2, 3.
105. Id. art. 9, para. 3.
106. Id. art. 9, para. 4.
107. Id. art. 10, para. 3.
108. Where any product is being imported in such increased quantities
and under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause: [A] serious
injury to domestic producers of like or directly competitive products in
the territory of one of the Contracting Parties, [or] [B] serious distur-
bances in any sector of the economy or difficulties which could bring
about serious deterioration in the economic situation of a region, the.
Community or [the Visegrad nation] may take appropriate measures
... in accordance... with Article 33.
Id. art. 30. This safeguard clause does not apply to coal, steel, textiles or agricul-
ture. These product areas are covered by separate protocols which contain simi-
lar safeguard clauses.
109. Id. art. 29; GATT, supra note 14, art. VI.
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turbance" to the domestic industry of the contracting party.110
Antidumping or serious injury complaints must first be brought
before the Association Council."" If no satisfactory solution is
reached within thirty days, the importing country is allowed to
adopt the "appropriate measures. '"112
The Visegrad countries are allowed an additional safeguard
option under the agreements which allows them to impose in-
creased customs duties in order to protect certain industries.1 3
These infant industry safeguard measures may be applied for a
maximum period of five years, or until the end of the transi-
tional period, whichever comes sooner. They are limited to 25%
ad valorem, and 15% of the total imports of industrial products
from the European Community. A country wishing to imple-
ment these restrictions must first inform and consult the Associ-
ation Council." i4
B. PROBLEM AREAS
The Europe Agreements make special arrangements for
trade in four key areas: steel, coal, agricultural products, and
textiles. Each of these areas is covered by a special protocol and
is not subject to the standard tariff reduction schedule otherwise
established by each Europe Agreement." 5 Unfavorable treat-
ment of these industries by the European Community has ham-
pered the Visegrad countries' ability to increase exports to
Western Europe; these products comprise a large part of the
Visegrad countries' exports"i6 because they are areas in which
the countries have a comparative advantage."17
Restrictions in steel, coal, agriculture, and textiles have led
to much friction between the two sides. The Visegrad Four have
demanded further concessions, while EC steel, agricultural and
110. Draft of Europe Agreement, supra note 95, art. 29.
111. Id. art. 33.
112. Id. art. 33(3)(b).
113. Article 28 of each Agreement provides that any Visegrad nation can
take "exceptional measures of limited duration ... in the form of increased
customs duties. These measures may only concern infant industries, or certain
sectors undergoing restructuring or facing serious difficulties, particularly
where these difficulties produce important social problems." Id. art. 28.
114. Id. art. 28.
115. Id art. 16, protocol 2 (ECSC Products); id, art. 17, protocol 3, annex
VII, chpt. II, arts. 18(1)(2), 19, 20 (Agricultural Products); id art. 15, protocol 1
(Textiles).
116. GATT, INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1990-91, supra note 5, at 23.
117. Cook & Snyder, supra note 50. Visegrad exports in all of these areas
increased substantially before the Interim Agreements took effect in 1991:
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textile interests have called for further tightening of restric-
tions. The European Community's protectionist attitude, along
with its apparent willingness to invoke safeguard clauses, has
created a "nuclear deterrence" effect (i.e., one does not have to
use it for it to work), discouraging new investment in Central
Europe. 18 A main reason for this friction is the recession plagu-
ing the European Community." 9 At the same time, Central Eu-
rope is adapting to free market capitalism better than expected,
and proving very competitive, especially in steel and agricul-
ture.120 Ironically, Central Europe now has freer markets than
Western Europe.' 2 ' EC protectionism for steel producers and
farmers is perceived as hypocritical by Visegrad governments,
which had been lead to believe that Western economies were
based on free market ideals.
1. Steel
Although Eastern European steel comprises only a small
portion of EC steel imports,122 EC steel interests are lobbying
VISEGRAD 3 EXPORTS TO EC BY PRODUCT (in $ Millions)
Czechoslovakia Hungary Poland
Food
1988 $193 $685 $787
1989 249 801 977
1990 270 884 1396
Iron & Steel
1988 311 128 166
1989 354 140 227
1990 446 204 356
Textiles
1988 186 83 75
1989 179 85 73
1990 229 128 108
GATT INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1990-91, supra note 5, at 25.
118. Stevenson, supra note 47, at C8.
119. Lionel Barber, Brussels Cuts EC Growth Forecast to 0.8% in 1993, FIN.
TIMEs, Jan. 13, 1993, at 1. Economic growth for the European Community for
1993 is predicted to be only about 0.8%. This is partly a result of Germany's
high interest rates, which in turn have been a consequence of Germany's goal of
preventing inflation in the wake of massive spending on reunification. Id.
120. Stevenson, supra note 47.
121. Europe's Hard Core, supra note 49, at 77 (stating that state subsidies to
industry in the former Czechoslovakia of 4.5% of GDP were two-thirds the level
of those in Italy). Guilt by Association, ECONOMIST, July 11, 1992, at 25 (regard-
ing drastic cuts in Hungarian and Polish farm subsidies to levels well below
those in Western Europe).
122. In 1990, Eastern European countries (including non-Visegrad countries
like Bulgaria and Romania) accounted for 10% of EC imports of iron and steel.
GATT INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1990-91, supra note 5, at 17. Czechoslovakia
alone accounted for 3.8%. Id. at 53. Current estimates put steel imports from
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strongly to prevent Visegrad access to their protected market. 2 3
The European Community steel industry is currently in the
midst of a transitory stage marked by overproduction.124 Every
steel producer in Western Europe is losing money,25 and plans
are being made to close a number of factories and to lay off as
many as 50,000 steelworkers. 2 6 Steel imports from Eastern Eu-
ropean producers are perceived as a major cause of this market
downturn.L2 7 Eastern steel is of inferior quality to Western
steel, but it is also less expensive and therefore a competitive
threat to EC producers.12 EC steel producers claim that
Visegrad steel is heavily subsidized, and thus deserves retalia-
tory measures from the European Community.m9
Quantitative restrictions on Hungarian, Polish and Czech
steel are scheduled to be eliminated when each Association
Agreement goes into effect. 13° Tariffs on Visegrad steel are
scheduled to be reduced by 20% annually and completely elimi-
nated after five years.131 The Czech Republic and Slovakia,
however, must renegotiate their agreements and may receive
less generous concessions. 132 Despite the elimination of restric-
tions and tariffs called for under the Interim Europe Agree-
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union together at about 4% of EC sales.
Tom Redburn, Pillar of European Unity, Steel Now Divides East and West,
INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, Jan. 28, 1993, at 1. Another estimate puts Visegrad ex-
ports at 3% of the EC's annual output. Feeling Sorry for Steel, ECONOMIST, Oct.
3, 1992, at 69. In 1992, the EC Commission asserted that Czechoslovakia "had
acquired up to 27% [sic] of the market" in steel. Peter Blackburn, EC Seeks to
Curb Steel Imports from East Europe, Reuter Business Report, Dec. 3, 1992,
available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
123. Some have called for the EC Commission to declare a "manifest crisis"
and impose set prices and production quotas under article 58 of the European
Coal and Steel Treaty. Smeltdown, ECONOMIST, Feb. 13, 1993, at 68.
124. Id. (estimating the European Community's excess capacity in raw steel
at 25.8 million tons out of a total capacity of 190 million tons).
125. Redburn, supra note 122.
126. Smeltdown, supra note 123, at 68; Andrew Hill, Brussels Calls for
Broader Cuts in EC Steel Industry, FIN. TIMES LTD., Feb. 18, 1993, at 1.
127. Feeling Sorry for Steel, supra note 122.
128. See Feeling Sorry for Steel, supra note 122 (stating that East European
steel sells for 25% less than the cheapest EC steel); Trade Relations, supra note
27, at 7.
129. Hill, supra note 126.
130. Czechoslovakia Interim Agreement, supra note 87, protocol 2, art. 4,
para. 1; Hungary Interim Agreement, supra note 87, protocol 2, art. 4, para. 1;
Poland Interim Agreement, supra note 87, protocol 2, art. 4, para. 1.
131. Czechoslovakia Interim Agreement, supra note 87, protocol 2, art. 2;
Hungary Interim Agreement, supra note 87, protocol 2, art. 2; Poland Interim
Agreement, supra note 87, protocol 2, art. 2.
132. Steel Quotas, supra note 94.
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ments, the European Community has retained the right to
impose safeguard measures and antidumping actions on
Visegrad steel.I'3 In August 1992, Germany, Italy, and France
tightened restrictions on steel imports from Czechoslovakia, af-
ter the European Community gave them permission based on
the safeguard clause in the Czech Interim Europe Agreement.'3
The EC Commission has also placed restrictions on imports of
Czech steel tubing.I 3 Such actions do not point to a commit-
ment on the part of the European Community to assist its East-
ern Neighbors in their transitions.
2. Coal
The coal industry in Europe, like the steel industry, is being
restructured. The recent decision to close a number of ineffi-
cient coal mines in the United Kingdom led to protest over
thousands of lost jobs.136 Thus, it is understandable that British
labor interests would resent the import of cheap brown Polish
coal which is of inferior quality to English coal. Meanwhile,
Eastern Europe is switching from heating with coal to natural
gas as quickly as possible in order to resolve air quality and other
environmental problems. 137
EC tariffs and quantitative restrictions on some Polish and
Czech coal products are scheduled to be progressively abolished
after one year, while others are to be abolished after four
years.1 3s EC tariffs on Hungarian coal products will be reduced
by 50% in January 1994, and eliminated at the end of 1995.139
Quantitative restrictions on some Hungarian coal products will
be abolished after one year. Restrictions on the rest will remain
in place for four years. 140 The European Community also re-
tains the option of invoking safeguard measures on coal and
steel products.141
133. Czechoslovakia Interim Agreement, supra note 87, protocol 2, art. 6;
Hungary Interim Agreement, supra note 87, protocol 2, art. 6; Poland Interim
Agreement, supra note 87, protocol 2, art. 6.
134. Trade Relations, supra note 27, at 7 (citing 1992 O.J. (L 56)).
135. Id. (citing Commission Decision 92/433/EEC).
136. Neville Nankivell, Keeping Uneconomic Coal Mines Open Is the Pits,
FIN. POST, Jan. 27, 1993, at 11.
137. STATE OF THE WORLD 30 (Lester R. Brown et al. eds., 1992).
138. Czechoslovakia Interim Agreement, supra note 87, protocol 2, ch. II,
arts. 5 and 7; Poland Interim Agreement, supra note 87, protocol 2, ch. II, arts. 5
and 7.
139. Hungary Interim Agreement, supra note 87, protocol 2, ch. II, art. 5.
140. Id. art. 7.
141. Czechoslovakia Interim Agreement, supra note 87, protocol 2, art. 6;
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3. Agriculture
Agriculture represents Eastern Europe's greatest potential
for increased exports to Western Europe. 142 The European
Community is, however, extremely protective of its farmers
under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), and a full range
of free trade in agriculture is not envisaged under the Europe
Agreements. 143
Import restrictions on most Visegrad agricultural products
under the Europe Agreements are covered by product-specific
annexes. Hungary, for example, is limited to selling only 5,000
tons of beef to the European Community during the first year of
the agreement, and only 6,000 tons per year after five years.'"
This is a significant constraint considering that in the mid-1970s,
Hungary had been selling 100,000 tons of beef per year to the
European Community, which then had fewer members.145
The Agreements do make some attempts at liberalizing
trade in agriculture. GSP status' 4 on a limited number of "mi-
nor" Visegrad agricultural products, which were originally in-
troduced under the PHARE program, will be continued under
the Europe Agreements. 147 In addition, paragraph 5 of Article
20 of each Agreement calls for each side to "examine on a regu-
lar basis... product by product ... the possibilities of granting
each other further concessions" in agriculture. 148
Hungary Interim Agreement, supra note 87, protocol 2, art. 6; Poland Interim
Agreement, supra note 87, protocol 2, art. 6.
142. Guilt by Association, supra note 121.
143. CEPR, supra note 52, at 82.
144. Trade Relations, supra note 27.
145. Id.
146. GSP status allows selected products to enter the EC duty-free or at sig-
nificantly reduced tariff rates. GSP status is typically granted on products from
developing countries. FOLSOM, supra note 40, at 208.
147. HUNGARIAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 100. The European
Community has granted the Visegrad Group "concessions" on minor agricul-
tural items such as geese, mushrooms, and soft fruit. PINDER, supra note 41, at
64; NELLO, supra note 6, at 115. Hungary and Poland, however, would like to
see greater concessions for major products such as cereals, beef, lamb and dairy
products. PINDFR, supra. The European Community, on the other hand, may
be more willing to budge on items such as pork, game, fruits and vegetables. Id.
148. Draft of Europe Agreement, supra note 95, art. 20, para. 5. Article 21,
however, provides that if any imports of agricultural products "cause serious
disturbances to the markets in the other party, both parties shall enter into
consultations immediately to find an appropriate solution. Pending such solu-
tion, the party concerned may take the measures it deems necessary." Id. art.
21.
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4. Textiles
Textiles are also given special treatment under the Europe
Agreements. 149 Most tariffs on Visegrad clothing and textiles
will be progressively reduced over a seven year period.150
Theoretically, the Visegrad countries have a comparative
advantage in the textile industry because it is labor intensive.151
If all trade barriers in textiles are removed, it is feared that EC
firms will move into the Visegrad countries and set up factories
at the expense of jobs in the European Community.
The future of East-West trade in textiles in Europe will be
determined largely by the results of the GATT Uruguay Round
negotiations. Current Interim Agreements provide for a new
protocol on textiles to be negotiated as soon as an agreement on
the Uruguay Round is reached. 152 The Uruguay Round proposes
to eliminate the current Multifibre Arrangement (MFA) 153 and
allow increased textile exports from developing countries to in-
dustrialized countries.154 One European textile organization has
issued a statement calling on the EC Commission to push for a
continuation of the MFA: "[t]he European textile . . . market,
which is already considerably open, cannot absorb [an increase
in imports from Asian countries] and at the same time import
149. Tariffs on some Visegrad textiles will be reduced to five-sevenths of the
basic duty upon entry into force of the agreement, to four-sevenths of the basic
duty at the start of the third year, and reduced by one-seventh of the original
tariff each year thereafter until they are completely eliminated at the beginning
of the seventh year. Czechoslovakia Interim Agreement, supra note 87, proto-
col 1, art. 2; Hungary Interim Agreement; supra note 87, protocol 1, art. 2; Po-
land Interim Agreement; supra note 87, protocol 1, art 2.
150. Id.
151. Actually, the "clothing" or "apparel" industry is labor intensive, while
the textile industry per se is much less so. The term as commonly used often
includes finished apparel. Protocol 1 of each Europe Agreement and Protocol 1
of each Interim Agreement applies to "textile and clothing products." Interest-
ingly, none of the Visegrad nations appear on the list of the top forty world
textile exporters. GATT INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1990-91, supra note 5, at 62.
Textiles, however, make up approximately 15% of Hungarian exports. Hun-
garian Chamber of Commerce, supra note 100, at 2.
152. Czechoslovakia Interim Agreement, supra note 87, protocol 1, art. 3,
para. 2; Hungary Interim Agreement, supra note 87, protocol 1, art. 3, para. 2;
Poland Interim Agreement, supra note 87, protocol 1, art. 3, para. 2 (stipulating
that any new tariff phase-out period will be equal to one-half of the period de-
cided in Uruguay Round negotiations).
153. The Multifibre Arrangement was first negotiated under the GATT in
1974 and allows countries broad discretion to control textile imports. Agree-
ment Regarding International Trade in Textiles, B.I.S.D. 21st Supp. 3 (1975);
amended July 31, 1991. B.I.S.D. 38th Supp. 113 (1992).
154. Vera Eckert, GATT Official Makes Case for Free Textiles Trade,
Reuters, Sept. 29, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
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products from Central Europe ... ."155 If the MFA is elimi-
nated, the Visegrad countries will face stiff competition from
Asia and may be priced out of the West European market. Thus
in the short term, it is in the Visegrad countries' interest to push
for unilateral trade concessions in textiles, rather than elimina-
tion of the MFA.1m
5. Resolution?
In order to generate the hard currency necessary to pay for
Western imports and to pay back Western loans, the Visegrad
Group needs to exploit its comparative advantage in agriculture,
steel and textiles.157 In the long run, both sides are formally
committed to eliminating all barriers in steel, coal and textiles
trade, and at least some barriers in agricultural trade. Recent
limits on Czech steel and other actions by the European Com-
munity, however, cast doubt on the European Community's
sincerity in this matter. Loosening restrictions in these areas
would not create an unbearable burden on EC industries.' 8 In
fact, EC consumers would benefit from cheaper food, clothing
and steel, and EC taxpayers would benefit from reduced subsidy
payments.
C. VISEGRAD - EFTA AGREEMENTS
In June 1990, all three Visegrad countries signed declara-
tions of cooperation with EFTA in the areas of trade, tourism,
transportation and the environment, 159 and agreements with in-
155. EC Textile Trade Unions Denounce Lack of Social Europe Progress
and Imports from Third Countries, Reuter Textlne, Dec. 4,1992, available in
LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
156. In the long run, however, the Visegrad countries would benefit from a
GATT agreement in trade with non-EC countries. More ECAccords and GAIT,
Financial Times Limited - East European Markets, Nov. 27, 1992 available in
LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File (quoting Andrzej Olechowski, economic ad-
visor to Polish President Lech Walesa, explaining that in the short term, coun-
tries with an association agreement actually gain from the lack of global trade
liberalization because they have secured better access to EC markets than com-
petitors, but states that "lack of a GATT agreement in the long run, however,
would complicate our trade relations with partners other than the EC.") ld
157. Stevenson, supra note 47.
158. See, e.g., EBRD Watch, Apr. 20, 1992, at 6, available in LEXIS, World
Library, Allwld File (citing "rough estimates" that the maximum cost of a full
liberalization of the four EC sectors which will compete with Visegrad export-
ers (agriculture, steel, textiles and chemicals) would be, at the maximum, a de-
crease in EC sectoral output in agriculture and textiles [apparel] of 2% to 4%).
159. Tadeusz Lamacz, Poland-EFTA Free Trade Agreement, Polish News
Bulletin, Dec. 15, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
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dividual EFTA members on agriculture.16° Czechoslovakia's
agreement with EFTA took effect in July 1992,161 and Poland's
Agreement took effect in December 1992.162 As of December
1992, Hungary was still finalizing the negotiations for its agree-
ment.163 These agreements are designed to be very similar to
the Europe Agreements with the European Community. For
example, EFTA tariffs will be phased out more quickly than
those on the Visegrad side, following the principle of asymme-
try.164 EFTA has also retained some restrictions on coal, steel
and textiles similar to those in the Europe Agreements.165
IV. EC MEMBERSHIP FOR THE VISEGRAD FOUR
The European Community has been described as a "pole of
attraction" for the countries of Eastern Europe. 1 All four
Visegrad countries, as well as a large number of other European
states, have asserted that it is their hope and intention to join
the European Community.167 This Note takes the position that
the European Community should allow the Visegrad Four to be-
come full members around the year 2000. This will allow the
European Community to complete negotiations on the Maas-
tricht Treaty, 168 and then expand to include most EFTA coun-
tries in 1995 or 1996.169 On the Visegrad side, it will provide time
160. EFTA does not have an equivalent to the Common Agricultural Policy
and thus is unable to negotiate in this area on behalf of its members. Poland,
for example, has completed bilateral agreements on trade in agricultural prod-
ucts with Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, Sweden and Austria. A Poland-Fin-
land agreement has not yet been completed. Id.
161. Id. The agreement is now valid with respect to the Czech Republic and
Slovakia.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Kennedy & Webb, supra note 11, at 649 (calling the European Commu-
nity a "pole of attraction"); id. at 652 (quoting EC Commission President Jac-
ques Delors who called the European Community a "lodestar" for Eastern
Europe); FOLSOM, supra note 40, at 312 (comparing the EC to a "magnet").
167. Many of the EFTA nations, as well as Malta, Turkey, and Cyprus, have
indicated that they wish to join the Community. EC. Europe Documents, No.
1790 - Commission Report on the Criteria and Conditions for Accession of
New Members, Reuter Textline, July 3, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Li-
brary, Allwld File. In the long term, countries such as Slovenia, Croatia,
Romania, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia may be also be considered;
see, e.g., John Palmer, EC: More Countries CZamour to Join the Community,
Reuter Textline, Mar. 21, 1991, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
168. See infra note 220.
169. See infra note 219.
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for rebuilding economies through increased trade under the Eu-
rope Agreements and the Central European Free Trade
Agreement.
A. BENEFITS OF VISEGRAD MEMBERSHIP IN THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY
Bringing the Visegrad Four into the European Community
makes sense for the same reasons the Common Market made
sense in the first place: increased economies of scale,170 larger
markets, exploitation of comparative advantages, increased com-
petition and harmonization of standards.171
In addition, EC producers would gain access to well-edu-
cated but inexpensive labor in Eastern Europe. 172 Germany's
extremely high labor costs make its products expensive on the
world market and give it a competitive disadvantage. 173 Even in
eastern Germany, wages are higher than in Britain.174 While
German laborers would not like to see jobs move to the Czech
Republic, Western Europe must act to supplement the labor sup-
ply which is forecast to shrink over a full percentage point by
the year 2015.175
Central Europe also represents an opportunity for EC inves-
tors. As Central European countries begin to rebuild their econ-
omies over the next twenty years, the Visegrad countries will
inevitably need to purchase large amounts of Western goods and
services. As part of the European Community, they would natu-
rally be more inclined to sign contracts with EC firms. 176 If the
European Community hesitates, however, Japanese and Ameri-
can firms could receive many of these contracts instead. Al-
ready, Japan has become the largest foreign investor in
Hungary.177 Without open access to EC markets, the Visegrad
Four simply will not be able to prosper economically, provide a
170. Susan Greenburg, Switzerland: Open Markets Fear Free Trade Failure,
Reuter Textline, Feb. 6, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
171. See, e.g., EC TREATY, supra note 7, art. 2.
172. Europe's Hard Core, supra note 49, at 77.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Before the Flood, ECONOMIST, Nov. 28, 1992, at 75.
176. Firms doing business in the Visegrad countries as part of the EC would
benefit from Community commercial legislation and standards, and the free
movement of capital and services. See EC TREATY, supra note 7, art. 58 (right of
establishment), art. 59 (free movement of services), arts. 67-70 (free movement
of capital).
177. Kosikova, supra note 1.
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market for EC goods or pay back Western loans.178
Another important consideration is the trend toward three
major global trading blocs: the North American Free Trade
Area,179 Japan/South East Asia, and the European Economic
Area.180 If the Visegrad countries are not included in the Euro-
pean trading bloc, their trading opportunities could be signifi-
cantly limited. From the European Community's perspective,
Central Europe is a huge potential market right next door. Just
as the United States is focusing more on Latin America to buy
its exports,181 the European Community may find itself looking
to sell more to Central Europe as access to North American or
Asian markets decreases.
There are also political and security reasons for increasing
economic cooperation with Central Europe. It is in the Euro-
pean Community's interest to have stable, democratic, peaceful
and economically prosperous neighbors. Ethnic conflicts in the
former Yugoslavia, now considered by some to have been a di-
rect result of the European Community's premature recognition
of Bosnia-Hercogovina, 8 2 demonstrate the fragility of new de-
mocracies in Eastern Europe. Because the European Commu-
nity appears incapable of forming a strong foreign policy, it
should be better able to ensure the stability of these new coun-
tries as fellow members of the European Community.183 For ex-
ample, Slovakia faces problems with its minority Hungarian
population and with restructuring its large arms industry.1l 4
178. Stevenson, supra note 47.
179. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) proposes to
create a free trade area among Canada, Mexico and the United States. The
Agreement was completed on Sept. 6, 1992 and was signed on December 17,
1992. The Agreement has not yet been adopted. North American Free Trade
Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Mexico-Canada (Draft of Sept. 6, 1992).
180. For a discussion of the EEA see infra note 219. For an interesting per-
spective on the inter-relationship between these three major trading groups
(written before the revolutions in Eastern Europe) see generally KENICHI
OHMAE, TRIAD POWER: THE COMING SHAPE OF GLOBAL COMPETITION (1985).
181. Gero Smith et al., Multinationals Step Lively to the Free Trade Bossa
Nova, Bus. WK., June 15, 1992, at 57.
182. See, e.g., The Yugoslav Drama: Account by Former Ambassador to the
EC, European Information Service, Jan. 13, 1993 (reviewing LE DRAME YOUGOS-
LAVE, a book written by former Yugoslav ambassador to the European Commu-
nity, Mihailo Crnobrnja); Edward Mortimer, What We Should Have Done:
Western Governments Must Learn from Their Failures in Yugoslavia to Pre-
vent Similar Tragedies Elsewhere, FIN. TIMES, Jan 6, 1993, at 12.
183. Robert J. Samuelson, Europe, Our Former Ally, WASH. POST, Nov. 18,
1992, at A23.
184. Andrew Nagorski, The Price of Disunity, NEWSWEEK (International Is-
sue, Special Edition), Jan. 4, 1993, at 13.
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Moreover, political or economic instability in Central Europe
will inevitably produce immigration to Western Europe. The
European Community can encourage Central Europeans to stay
home by helping them achieve domestic stability as part of the
Community.
Environmental pollution produced by poor and inefficient
economies presents another serious problem which has already
crossed the extensive Visegrad/EC border. For example, West
European forests have been severely damaged by airborne pollu-
tion released from the industrial "death triangle" formed by
Germany, Poland and the Czech Republic.185
The Visegrad countries have few reasons to hesitate joining
the European Community. Any perceived loss of sovereignty
will be outweighed by increased political participation in Euro-
pean affairs. In addition, full membership would give these
countries the stability they so desperately need. The possibility
of being overwhelmed by Western goods,i s and the loss of pro-
tectionist options are more than counterbalanced by access to
EC markets and the benefit of regional development funds.
Those countries which have joined the European Community
since it was first created in 1958 have benefitted from a much
higher rate of economic growth after their accession to the
Community. 187
B. COSTS OF VISEGRAD MEMBERSHIP
The greatest obstacle preventing the Visegrad countries'
membership in the European Community is their relatively
weak economic condition and the large resulting cost of their
assimilation into the Common Market.188 The immediate cost to
the European Community of including the four countries is esti-
mated at eight billion ECU per year. 8 9 It has proven difficult,
however, to predict the cost of rebuilding Eastern Europe. Ger-
many is spending between $78 and $98 billion annually on eco-
185. PINDER, supra note 41, at 95.
186. Europe: Chances Slim for Central European Countries to Join EC, In-
ter Press Service, Oct. 20, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwid File.
187. CEPR, supra note 52, at 64.
188. Id. at 59-73.
189. Id. at 72. This figure was derived from calculating the (negative) net
contribution that would accrue to each nation under the European Commu-
nity's current budgetary structure, including receipts for development assist-
ance and the Common Agricultural Policy (based on 1989 agricultural output
levels). Id. Broken down by nation and source the figures are as follows (in
Millions of ECU. Figures for Czechoslovakia are before breakup):
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nomic reforms and subsidies in the former East Germany. 19°
This experience has made the European Community wary of the
ultimate costs of a Visegrad expansion of the European
Community.
The bulk of the cost to the European Community of a
Visegrad expansion would be development assistance. Poorer
EC members see the Visegrad countries competing for a piece of
finite EC regional development funds. 191 Currently, any region
with a per capita GDP of less than 75% of the EC average quali-
fies for "least-favored" status and receives aid under the Euro-
pean Regional Development Fund.x92 Spain, Italy, Portugal and
Ireland will also receive development funds through the Maas-
tricht Treaty.193 If the Visegrad countries joined the European
Community, the European Community's average GDP would
fall, causing some regions to become ineligible for development
funds. Of course, these criteria would probably be changed. For
example, the new (former East) German Ldnder are not now
included in calculations of the EC average GDP for the purpose
Receipts from Receipts
Country Contribution Develop. Assistance from CAP Total
Czechoslovakia (617) 1,360 446 1,189
Hungary (341) 1,255 544 1,458
Poland (817) 4,600 1,409 5,192
7,839
Interestingly, under the current structure of the CAP, the net transfer to the
Visegrad Four would be about the same if their incomes and agricultural output
both doubled. Id. This is because the reduction in developmental assistance
would be canceled out by an increase in agricultural price support.
190. Helmut Kohl's Hour of Need, ECONOMIST, Oct. 31, 1992, at 47.
191. The poorer EC members have also expressed concern that the Visegrad
Four will cut into their market share for certain low cost products. The CEPR
has concluded that Visegrad membership would not lead to significantly in-
creased competition with the exports of the poorer of the existing EC members,
however. CEPR, supra note 52, at 79.
192. The European Community has what is known as a "regional policy,"
under article 130(a) of the Treaty of Rome, committed to reducing economic
disparities between regions. EC TREATY, supra note 7, art. 130(a). A region is
"least favored" (meaning it qualifies for aid) if its per capita income is less then
75% of the EC average. Currently, the Mezzogiorno region of Italy, most of
Portugal, Greece and Ireland, and parts of other member states are receiving
assistance under this program. FOLSOM, supra note 40, at 178-179 (stating that
any member country with a GDP less than 50% of the European Community's
average GDP is eligible); For Richer, for Poorer, ECONOMIST, Jan. 30, 1993, at 72
(stating that the standard is now 75% of the EC average).
193. A new "Cohesion Fund" allocates funds for those member nations with
GDP per capita below 90% of the EC average. This is essentially an incentive to
ensure their approval of the Maastricht Treaty. For Richer, for Poorer, supra
note 192, at 72.
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of determining development fund eligibility.194 Also, if any
EF'A countries join the European Community, they will have a
counterbalancing positive effect on average GDP, and could also
contribute approximately four billion ECU annually for devel-
opment funds.1 95 These amounts will not be enough to com-
pletely offset the cost of absorbing the Visegrad countries,
however.196
Wealthier EC members are wary of a Visegrad expansion of
the European Community because they will shoulder the cost of
development assistance' 9" The European Community, how-
ever, is already committed to providing some financial assistance
for Central Europe, through the EBRD, PHARE and Europe
Agreements. 198 Whether or not this aid is instead channeled
through regional development funds as part of internal EC poli-
cies, does not change the recognized need and commitment of
the European Community to support Central Europe. In fact,
the real issue is whether Central Europe will be able to repay
these loans and other forms of assistance through expanding ex-
ports, or whether it will be shut out of EC markets. The Euro-
pean Community cannot give "aid, not trade" to the Visegrad
Four, it must provide "aid and trade." If the European Commu-
nity provides both aid and trade, the short-term cost will be re-
turned manyfold through new markets and political security.
194. Id.
195. CEPR, supra note 52, at 72. According to this estimate, if Switzerland,
Norway, Finland, Sweden and Austria joined the European Community, they
would be net annual contributors to the tune of 3,512 ECU. Id. The EFTA
nations may resent this demand on their resources. Indeed, one reason Switzer-
land may have vetoed the EEA proposal is because it would have called for
them to contribute to regional development programs already in effect in the
European Community. Frances Williams, Swiss No to Closer Ties Leaves EFTA
Picking up the Pieces, FIN. TiMEs, Dec. 10, 1992, at 7.
196. CEPR, supra note 52, at 73.
197. The Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) has concluded that
the cost of immediate EC membership for Poland, Hungary, the former Czecho-
slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria is too high to be feasible without a change in
the EC budgetary mechanism. CEPR, supra note 52, at 73. This Note considers
only the prospects for membership of the Visegrad Four, however, and suggests
that a change in the EC's Common Agricultural Policy, combined with other
special provisions for the Visegrad Four, could add up to an acceptable package
for Visegrad membership somewhat sooner than the twenty-year waiting pe-
riod recommended by the CEPR.
198. Trade Relations, supra note 27, at 14. Other than PHARE and Euro-
pean Investment Bank loans, the EC Commission alone guaranteed $1 billion to
Hungary. Id. at 15. On October 9, 1989, the Council decided that Eastern Eu-
rope was eligible for 1.7 billion ECU from the European Investment Bank. Id.
at 15.
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Another obstacle to Visegrad membership is the EC's Com-
mon Agricultural Policy (CAP).'" The Visegrad Four are rela-
tively dependant on agriculture,2 and their high agricultural
output will only increase as they introduce more efficient meth-
ods of production and market forces.201 Their surplus will only
add to current problems with the European Community's
overburdened CAP.20 2 Under current terms and agricultural
output, the Visegrad Four would be eligible for 2.4 billion ECU
in annual subsidies from the CAP.20 3
The CAP is already under considerable strain, and the Eu-
ropean Community will probably have to reexamine its agricul-
tural policy soon, whether or not the Visegrad countries join the
European Community. To expect the European Community to
completely restructure its CAP is unrealistic, especially if
France continues to dominate EC agriculture policy. Germany
could, however, assert itself as a countervailing voice.2°4 Ger-
many has a great interest in being able to buy cheaper agricul-
tural products from Eastern Europe, and in increasing the
wealth of East European farmers who will then be able to
purchase German products.205
The European Community currently spends approximately
65% of its budget on the CAP.206 Each EC household pays $500
per year in taxes and higher food prices to support EC farmers
who make up only nine million of the European Community's
320 million people.20 7 According to one estimate, if the EC's
Common Agricultural Policy did not exist, EC food prices would
decrease by 40% and the Visegrad countries would see two per-
199. EC TREATY arts. 38-42. For a description of how the CAP functions, see
generally FOLSOM, supra note 40, at 194-200; NELLO, supra note 6, at 107-145
(regarding the CAP and Eastern Europe); John F. Hudson, The European Com-
munity's Common Agricultural Policy (1984), excerpted in JACKSON & DAVEY,
supra note 88, at 965.
200. Percentage of Labor force in Agriculture: Poland 27%; Portugal 19%;
Hungary 19%; Spain 16%; Czech and Slovak Federal Republic 12%; Italy 10%;
France 9%; Denmark 6%; Germany 5%; MARK S. HOFFMAN, WORLD ALMANAC
AND BOOK OF FACTS 747-799 (1993).
201. CEPR, supra note 52, at 83 (citing estimates that by the year 2000 the
countries of Eastern Europe will be net exporters of wheat and possibly other
grains and livestock and that the opening of the Eastern economies to world
trade will reduce world prices of wheat by 5%, pork by 5%, and beef by 1%).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 72.
204. See Europe's Hard Core, supra note 49, at 77.
205. Id.
206. FOLSOM, supra note 40, at 331.
207. All Eyes on France, WALL ST. J., Nov. 24, 1992, at A14.
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centage points a year added to their GDP through increased ag-
ricultural sales.m
C. REQUIREMENTS FOR MEMBERSHIP
Although it is generally accepted that the Visegrad coun-
tries will eventually join the European Community, the Euro-
pean Community has not set a timetable, specified what criteria
membership would be based upon, or even made a formal com-
mitment.2° The Visegrad-EC Europe Agreements, considered
by some to be a "first step" to EC membership, mention the pos-
sibility only once, in the preamble: "[Recognizing] the fact that
the final objective of [Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic,
Slovakia] is to become a member of the Community and that
this association, in the view of the Parties, will help to achieve
this objective .... ,,210 It is unclear exactly what sort of obliga-
tion this clause creates on the part of the European Community.
Turkey has had a similar clause in its Association Agreement
since 1963,211 and is probably still farther from membership than
are the Visegrad countries.2 12
Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome governs application for
EC membership. It states, "Any European state may apply to
become a member of the Community. The conditions of admis-
sion and the adjustments to this Treaty necessitated thereby
shall be the subject of an agreement between the Member States
and the applicant State. '213 No such agreement has yet been es-
tablished. Frans Andriessen, EC Commissioner for Foreign Re-
lations, believes that there is little chance of membership before
the end of the century.214 He said that while the European Com-
208. Europe's Hard Core, supra note 49, at 77.
209. Remarks of Speaker, 1992 O.J. (Annex 3-413) 256 (Apr. 18, 1991) (De-
bates of European Parliament).
210. Draft of Europe Agreement, supra note 95, at 3.
211. Agreement Establishing an Association Between the European Eco-
nomic Community and Turkey, Sept. 12, 1963, No C 113/2, at 1, (reading in per-
tinent part, "RECOGNIZING that the support given by the [EC] to the efforts
of the Turkish people to improve their standard of living will facilitate the ac-
cession of Turkey to the Community at a later date").
212. Turkey's membership is problematic for the following reasons, inter
alia: It has a large and growing population and a relatively low per capita GDP,
it has a large percentage of labor force in agriculture, it has certain cultural,
ethnic and religious differences with the European Community, and a historical
enmity with Greece, which has consistently opposed its application for
membership.
213. EC TREATY, supra note 7.
214. Europe: Chances Slim for Central European Countries to Join EC,
supra note 186.
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munity is eager to have closer relations with the Visegrad
Group, it is against any "immediate" membership initiatives.215
One major study contends that the Visegrad countries will be
too poor for the next twenty years to be accepted for
membership.216
The EC Commission, while asserting that the Visegrad
countries are not now ready for membership, has recognized
that they have needs "which go beyond the possibilities of ex-
isting agreements. '217 The Commission has made the suggestion
that perhaps the Visegrad countries could be granted "partner-
member" status, with the possibility to "participate, (but not to
vote) in certain Community meetings on subjects of trans-Euro-
pean interest. '218
The European Community currently faces a number of
challenges that distract it from the question of Visegrad mem-
bership. These include: membership applications from Turkey,
Malta, and Cyprus; the burden of already existing subsidies for
Portugal, Greece, Spain, Italy, Ireland, and the former East Ger-
many; the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations; the proposed
new European Economic Area (EEA);219 ethnic conflicts in the
215. Id.
216. See generally CEPR, supra note 52. The CEPR report is an in-depth
economic analysis of the prospect for a Visegrad expansion of the European
Community. It concludes that under current political and budgetary con-
straints the European Community cannot now afford to accept the Visegrad
Four, but should immediately expand the Europe Agreements in the form of a
"European Economic Space" with free trade in all agricultural and non-agricul-
tural products, services and capital, but not labor. Based on predictions of
Visegrad Economic growth, it recommends that the Visegrad Four will have
caught up to Portugal's then economic level in about twenty years (i.e. 2012)
and should not be accepted before this occurs. This Note asserts that Visegrad
accession should take place earlier, i.e. approximately the year 2000. The exact
year that the Visegrad Four eventually join the European Community is less
important than a firm commitment on the part of the European Community to
such a union.
217. EC" Europe Documents; NO. 1790 - Commission Report on the Crite-
ria and Conditions for New Members, Reuter Textline Agence Europe, July 3,
1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
218. Id.
219. On May 2, 1992, the EC and EFTA concluded an agreement creating a
"European Economic Area" (EEA) comprising both groups and representing
40% of the world's trade. Robert Powell, EC and EFTA Join to Form Huge
European Market, Reuter Library Report, May 2, 1992, available in LEXIS,
World Library, Allwld File.
The EEA will allow the free movement of all non-agricultural goods, labor,
services and capital between the European Communities and the European
Free Trade Area. See generally EFTA BULLETIN 2/92, Joint Press Release
Drqfted by the Council Secretariat of the EC and the EFTA Secretariat (giving a
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former Yugoslavia and a major recession in Western Europe.
However, the two most immediate issues facing the European
Community are the Maastricht Treaty220 and applications for
membership by most of the EFTA countries.22'
1. The Maastricht Treaty
Various spokesmen for the European Community have
stated quite clearly that it must first resolve the Maastricht
Treaty before it can add the EFTA applicants, much less con-
sider membership for the Visegrad countries. 22 2 This is often re-
ferred to as the "deepening vs. widening" controversy.2 2 3
"Deepening" refers to strengthening ties among existing mem-
bers as proposed by the Maastricht Treaty.2 24 "Widening"
means expanding outward to bring in the EFTA countries, the
Visegrad Four and other European countries not currently in
the European Community. These two processes are not mutu-
ally exclusive. The controversy lies in how to allocate political
energy and attention.
In a sense, the debate over whether the European Commu-
nity should deepen or widen has already been decided. Four of
detailed description of the terms of the Agreement). The EEA was scheduled
to take effect on January 1, 1993. In December of 1992, however, the citizens of
Switzerland vetoed the proposal in a referendum. Williams, supra note 195.
This has caused some uncertainty as to the future of the Agreement. Neverthe-
less, officials feel certain that the proposal can be renegotiated, with or without
Switzerland, and should take effect some time in 1993. Id; See also EC Will
Kick off Formal Enlargement Talks on February 1, Agence France Presse, Dec.
12, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File [hereinafter EC En-
largement Talks].
220. The Maastricht Treaty was proposed On December 11, 1991 in Maas-
tricht, Netherlands. Its basic elements are: committing the European Commu-
nity to a common currency for at least some member nations by 1999;
establishing common foreign and defense policies for member states; increasing
the European Community's role in social policy; increasing aid for Ireland,
Greece, Spain and Portugal; and increasing the powers of the European Parlia-
ment. Danish voters rejected the Maastricht treaty on June 2, 1992, causing
turmoil within the European Community. France subsequently narrowly ap-
proved the proposal, however, giving the proposal new life. See generally Wal-
ter Goldstein, Europe After Maastricht, FOREIGN AFF. Vol. 70, Winter 1992/93.
221. See infra note 231 and accompanying text.
222. See, e.g., Visegrad Group States Membership in EC to Be Decided in
1995, PAP Polish Press Agency, PAP Newswire, Jan. 26, 1993, available in
LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File (quoting British Secretary of State for For-
eign Relations Douglas Hurd); EC/Visegrad States: Delors Promises List of EC
Membership Criteria for Edinburgh, European Information Service, Nov. 3,
1992 available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File (quoting Jacques Delors).
223. See, e.g., Cook & Snyder, supra note 50.
224. See generally Goldstein, supra note 220.
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the EFTA applicants seem sure to join by 1996. Plans for a mon-
etary union should not conflict with a Visegrad expansion, be-
cause even some of the current EC members would not
immediately be eligible for such a plan.225 This type of "deepen-
ing" will probably take place at different speeds in different
countries.226
2. EFTA
It has been suggested that the Visegrad countries should
join EFTA before they join the European Community, and that
EFTA could serve as a door into the greater European Economic
Area (EEA), and as a training ground for full EC member-
ship.2 27 After all, the Visegrad countries account for a larger
proportion of EFTA members' trade than they do for that of EC
members,228 and Austria and Switzerland especially are increas-
ing their trade with the Visegrad Group.2 29 In absolute terms,
however, the European Community is a much more important
trading partner for the Visegrad countries.230
The Visegrad Four should concentrate on joining the Euro-
pean Community rather than EFTA. The primary reason for
this is that EFTA is dissolving. Five of the seven members of
EFTA (Austria, Finland, Norway, Switzerland and Sweden)
have formally applied to join the European Community. Only
Iceland and Liechtenstein have not.231 It would be futile for the
Visegrad Four to join a Free Trade Area which will likely con-
sist only of Liechtenstein and Iceland, even if it were part of the
larger European Economic Area. It makes more sense to join
the European Community directly than to add another hurdle to
225. Id. at 125.
226. Id.
227. Robert Evans, EFTA Viewed as Eastern European Training Ground
for EC Entry, Router Library Report, June 21, 1992, available in LEXIS, World
Library, Allwld File; Howard LaFranchi, Free Trade Zone from Lisbon to Hel-
sinki Waits in the Wings, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 30, 1992, at 10 (quot-
ing Nic Gronvall, Swedish Commissioner to the EEA surveillance authority);
Williams, supra note 201.
228. Evans, supra note 227.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. EC Enlargement Talks, supra note 219. Formal negotiations were to
begin on February 1, 1993 to bring in Austria, Sweden and Finland into the
Community. Norway's application has not yet been approved by the European
Commission, but it was expected to begin negotiations in March 1993. Member-
ship for these four nations is envisaged for 1995, but Switzerland is in a more
precarious position, having recently said "no" to the proposed EEA.
1993]
MINN. J GLOBAL TRADE
the process.232
D. THE MEDITERRANEAN PRECEDENT
The accession of three Mediterranean countries, Portugal,
Spain, and Greece, and the non-accession of another, Turkey,
present useful comparisons for the Visegrad countries. Greece,
Portugal and Spain all joined the European Community approx-
imately a decade after the restoration of democracy in each
country.233 If the Visegrad Four followed a similar schedule,
membership for these countries would happen in approximately
the year 2000.
Portugal and Spain faced obstacles in the 1980s very similar
to those facing the Visegrad countries today: the United King-
dom worried about low-wage industries, such as textiles, France
and Italy worried about agricultural surpluses,2 Germany was
concerned about an influx of migrant workers, and the whole
Community doubted Spain's highly protected automobile and
steel industries' ability to compete in the EC market.23 But
Spain and Portugal have adjusted well to the single market.236
They achieved their success with long adjustment periods, grad-
ual tariff phase-outs, a restructuring of the EC's Common Agri-
cultural Policy, and regional assistance.237 A Visegrad accession
would likely follow a similar adjustment period. This would be
in addition to the adjustment mechanism preceding membership
under the Europe Agreements. Greece preceded its 1981 EC ac-
cession with an association agreement which lasted for twenty
years.238
232. EFTA does offer some lessons for the Visegrad Four, however. The
EFTA nations made a priority of integrating EC technical standards, laws and
regulations, as well participating other European "clubs" and organizations to
emphasize its members' equal status as European nations. The Visegrad coun-
tries should emulate this strategy by beginning now to harmonize laws and reg-
ulations, as well as by participating in other European organizations.
233. CEPR, supra note 52, at 60.
234. Christopher Johnson, Portugal and Spain Prepare for Entry into Com-
mon Market; Community, also Must Make Concessions to Accommodate New
Members, AM. BANKER, Dec. 16, 1981, at 12; see also PINDER, supra note 41, at 72.
235. Johnson, supra note 234.
236. Spain had the fastest growing Economy in the European Community
between 1986 and 1991. Only in 1992 have there been signs of a slowdown as its
economy matures. Roger Cohen, Spain's Progress Turns to Pain, N. Y. TIMES,
Nov. 17, 1992, at C1. Portugal's GDP grew at a similar pace after accession.
CEPR, supra note 52, at 64.
237. See generally FERNANDO A. ILERA, EL RETO DE EUROPA: ESPANA EN
LA CEE, (Editorial Sintesis, Madrid 1988).
238. Greece signed the agreement in 1961 and joined in 1981. Agreement
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One reason Spain, Greece and Portugal were accepted into
the European Community was to aid in the stability of their
newly democratic governments.239 For example, the European
Community temporarily suspended trade relations with Greece
under its association agreement when Greece suffered a relapse
from democracy.m° The same motivation may convince the Eu-
ropean Community to bring in the Visegrad Four. The Euro-
pean Community claims to have a strong interest in supporting
democracy in Europe.241 Accepting the Visegrad countries into
the European Community would be a strong demonstration of
this commitment.
Turkey concluded an Association Agreement with the Euro-
pean Community in 1963, and formally applied for membership
in 1987. 242 The European Community is still keeping Turkey's
application under consideration but membership does not seem
likely anytime soon.2 43 The Visegrad Four could languish, as
Turkey is, in the limbo of "association" without receiving the
stability of full membership they desperately need. More likely,
however, they will strengthen ties through the Europe Agree-
ments over a period of a decade or so, as Greece did, and then
make the transition to membership, followed by another adjust-
ment period like that allowed for Spain and Portugal.
Although the Visegrad Group is attempting to coordinate
the application process among its members, there may be draw-
backs to collectively applying for EC membership as Spain and
Portugal did. Because the Visegrad countries have similar econ-
omies, problematic areas like steel and agriculture will be com-
pounded by a factor of four. Similarly, when Spain and Portugal
joined the European Community (only five years after Greece),
the European Community was faced with a surplus of Mediter-
ranean agricultural products such as wine, olives and citrus
fruit.244
Establishing an Association Between the European Economic Community and
Greece, July 9, 1961, 63/107/EEC.
239. Johnson, supra note 234.
240. PINDER, supra note 41, at 61. EC relations with Greece were frozen
from 1967 to 1974 during the "Colonel's rule." RAND McNALLY WORLD FACTS
IN BRIEF 36 (1986).
241. Id at 37.
242. FOLSoM, supra note 40, at 19.
243. See supra, note 212.
244. ILERA, supra note 237, at 67-69.
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E. PROSPECTS BY COUNTRY
Regardless of whether the Visegrad Four apply for EC
membership as a group, each country will have to fulfill certain
criteria on its own.245 The only legal condition for membership
in the European Community is that the applicant state be "Euro-
pean."2 46 Realistically, the decision is primarily based on the
economic strength of the applicant, because wealthier countries
are less of a burden on the European Community's budget.
According to the Centre for Economic Policy Research, the
only previously successful applicants for EC membership whose
per capita GDP was less than 80% of the poorest incumbent (Ire-
land and Portugal) were small enough that their burdens on EC
resources were easily absorbable.2 4 7 It follows, therefore, that
those Visegrad countries with either small populations or rela-
tively high per capita GDP have a better prospect for member-
ship than those with larger, poorer populations.
The Czech Republic has perhaps the best potential for early
EC membership because it is the wealthiest of the Visegrad
Four. In 1992 Czechoslovakia's per capita GDP was $3,400.248
The corresponding figure for the Czech Republic alone will be
somewhat higher, because it was the wealthier half of the for-
mer nation.24 9 This would probably place it near Portugal with a
per capita GDP of $3,800.250 Furthermore, the new Czech Re-
public's population of 10.4 million25 ' is almost exactly the same
as Portugal's. As of May 1992, the Czech Republic's unemploy-
ment rate was among the lowest in Europe at about 3.2%.252 The
Czech Republic is also the Visegrad country least dependant on
agriculture, which means it would be less of a drain on the CAP.
245. Remarks of Jensen, 1992 O.J. (Annex 3-404) 260 (Apr. 18, 1991) (De-
bates of European Parliament: "I would urge you not to put all the countries of
Central and Eastern Europe in the same basket. We must look at each country
individually both now and in the future. The last country to become economi-
cally and politically ready to apply for membership should not be allowed to
hold up all the others.").
246. EC TREATY, supra note 7, art. 237.
247. CEPR, supra note 53, at 59.
248. CEPR, supra note 52, at 61. This figure is used in the interests of con-
sistency with those cited for the other Visegrad nations. Economic data for
Central Europe is difficult to determine. THE ECONOMIST has estimated GNP
per capita for the Czech Republic at $2,346. Check, 0 Slovakia, supra note 81, at
55.
249. Check, 0 Slovakia, supra note 81, (estimating 1990 GNP per capita at
$2,346 for the Czech Republic and $1,943 for Slovakia).
250. CEPR, supra note 52, at 61.
251. Check, 0 Slovakia, supra note 81.
252. Id,
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Despite these positive indicators, Prime Minister Klaus' state-
ment that the Czech Republic would join the European Commu-
nity in "two or three years"253 is overly optimistic. The Czech
Republic must renegotiate its Europe Agreement and its future
will continue to be strongly influenced by the actions of Slovakia
on human rights and other issues.
With a per capita GNP of $2,600 and a population of 10.4
million, Hungary is the second wealthiest Visegrad member in
per capita terms.254 Hungary's per capita GDP, however, is far
less than that of Portugal ($3,800),2 and far below the 1990 EC
average of $18,400. 25 Hungary has set a goal of membership by
1996.257 Former EC Commissioner for Trade Relations, Willy de
Clerq, said he believed that Hungary was in the best position for
potential membership, because of its good international credit
rating.2-, Even so, he believes that Hungary would not be eco-
nomically ready for at least ten years.2 59
Poland faces the most problematic prospects for member-
ship because it is the largest and poorest of the Visegrad Four.
Poland has a population of thirty-eight million people, more
than the other three Visegrad countries combined, and a per
capita GDP of $1,900.260 Poland's economy has recently been do-
ing remarkably well after a headlong rush into capitalism. Its
economy is forecast to grow by as much as 2% in 1993.261 It
posted a $750 million trade surplus in 1992 and its unemploy-
ment rate has fallen to about 12%.262 However, inflation is
climbing to near 50% and Poland's budget deficit for 1992 was
about 7% of its GNP, and may rise to 10% in 1993.263
Figures for Slovakia's GDP are not yet available, but its
GNP per capita has been estimated at $1,943.26 Slovakia has in-
dicated less of a commitment to economic reform then any other
253. Czech Premier Objects, supra note 59.
254. CEPR, supra note 52, at 61.
255. 1d
256. EUROSTAT, BASIC STATISTICS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 40 (29th
ed. 1992) (based on a figure of ECU 14,488 and a 1990 exchange rate of US $1.27
per ECU).
257. Europe: Chances Slim for Central European Countries to Join EC,
supra note 186.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. CEPR, supra note 52, at 61.
261. Barry Newman, Vital Signs Point to Poland's Recovery, WALL. ST. J.,
Oct. 22, 1992, at A12.
262. I&
263. Id.
264. Check, 0 Slovakia, supra note 81.
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of the Visegrad countries.m While the Czech Republic is pre-
dicting economic growth in 1993, Slovakia will probably see a 10-
15% drop in GNP.266 The unemployment rate in Slovakia is al-
most four times higher than that in the Czech Republic.267
While the future of Europe's newest country is uncertain,
Slovakia may be able to join the European Community as soon
as the other Visegrad countries.268 Despite its low per capita
GDP, its population of 5.3 million should be easily absorbable. 269
Slovakia's Prime Minister, Vladimir Meciar, has indicated that
Slovakia will cut its military production,2 70 and guarantee pro-
tection for its Hungarian minority.271 Meciar has also begun
limiting freedom of the press, however, which does not endear
him or his tiny country to the West.272 Because of the extensive
economic ties between the Czech Republic and Slovakia, it is dif-
ficult, but by no means impossible, to imagine one joining the
European Community without the other.
CONCLUSION
The fall of Communism has brought democracy and free
market reforms to the Visegrad Countries of Central Europe.
These countries will not be able economically to stand on their
own, however. Increasing external trade will be a critical com-
ponent of their continued economic growth. The former Soviet
Union, which used to be Central Europe's largest trading part-
ner, is now facing severe economic and political problems of its
own. Therefore the Visegrad Four have redirected their efforts
at trade expansion toward the European Community.
Europe Agreements between each Visegrad country and the
European Community will establish a solid basis for EC-
Visegrad trade relations. The next step should be a commitment
by the European Community to full EC membership for the
Visegrad Four, preferably by the end of this century. EC mem-
265. Id.; see also Robinson, supra note 4.
266. Nagorski, supra note 184.
267, Currently unemployment in Slovakia is approximately 11.8%. Check, 0
Slovakia, supra note 81.
268. France to Support Slovak Entry into EC - Dumas, Reuter Library Re-
port, Jan. 12, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File. But see
Slovakia Disintegrating After Three Months, LONDON OBSERVER, Apr. 4, 1993.
269. Check, 0 Slovakia, supra note 81.
270. EC. Slovak Prime Minister Does Not Foresee Early EC Membership,
Reuter Textline, Feb. 25, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
271. Id
272. Church, Editor's Dismissal Arouses Fears for Slovak Press, Reuter Li-
brary Report, Jan. 5, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
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bership would help stabilize new democratic governments in
these countries and at the same time strengthen the security of
Western Europe. It would also facilitate economic growth for
the Visegrad Four and create significant trade and investment
opportunities for the European Community.

